kaal:claim:5225296-032

Weighted voting creates a Nash equilibrium favoring honest participation, because creating additional Sybil identities yields no extra voting power absent corresponding contributions.

Source quote, verbatim

Game-theoretic analysis indicates that this creates a Nash equilibrium where honest participation is incentivized, as creating Sybil identities yields no additional voting power without corresponding contributions

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025), Weighted Voting as a Sybil Attack Defense
https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296

Holds when

constrained by cryptographic and temporal verification mechanisms

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedgovernance-designeconomicsconsensus-and-security

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:6192998-030 Honest ranking strictly dominates strategic ranking for validators whenever the reputation gain from consensus...

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