kaal:claim:617681-037

Compensating arbitrators by the number of cases they hear gives litigants a substantial role in shaping the system but may yield decisions so eager to please all parties that they lack decisiveness, sound reasoning and value as precedent.

Source quote, verbatim

This approach gives litigants a substantial role in shaping the arbitration system, but may result in decisions that are so eager to please all parties that they lack decisiveness or sound legal reasoning and thus lack value as precedent.

From

Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004), E.III.1 A General Framework for Arbitration of Corporate Law in Europe, p. 41
https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 · source PDF

Cite as

Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

Holds when

conventional arbitration in which litigants select and pay arbitrators

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: split-the-difference-arbitrationfamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentrisk-and-incentiveslaw-and-legal-systems

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