kaal:claim:6192998-034

High concentration of reputation among foundational contributors is socially optimal because it correctly prices the nonrivalrous, increasing returns character of foundational knowledge.

Source quote, verbatim

This is socially optimal because it correctly prices the nonrivalrous, increasing-returns nature of foundational knowledge.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Domain-Specific Reputation Systems From Binary Validation to Citation-Weighted Knowledge Attribution (2026), IV.G. Long-Run Knowledge Graph Dynamics, p. 47
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6192998 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Domain-Specific Reputation Systems From Binary Validation to Citation-Weighted Knowledge Attribution (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6192998

Holds when

systems that maintain low barriers to entry alongside the concentration

Classification

normativesupport: arguedreputationeconomicscitation-and-knowledge

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