kaal:claim:6269518-013

Existing proofs that validators have a truth-telling equilibrium for quality ranking do not establish that job-performing agents have incentive-compatible strategies for honest citation, because these are distinct strategic actors facing distinct choices within distinct mechanism structures; conflating them is a genuine error.

Source quote, verbatim

It does not establish that job-performing agents have incentive-compatible strategies for honest citation. These are distinct strategic actors facing distinct strategic choices within distinct mechanism structures. Conflating the two is a genuine error.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026), III. The Missing Game-Theoretic Proof, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

Holds when

validator truth-telling results proved for quality ranking mechanisms

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: misapplied equilibrium prooffamily: research-design-limitationeconomicsconsensus-and-security

Related claims

supersedes kaal:claim:6192998-030 Honest ranking strictly dominates strategic ranking for validators whenever the reputation gain from consensus...

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