kaal:claim:6269518-033

The equilibrium depends on a design requirement rather than an assumption: mechanism parameters must be chosen so that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs its positive effect on the value score, at which point increasing self-citation strictly decreases utility.

Source quote, verbatim

the mechanism parameters (θ = 0.6, reputation coefficient = 2) are chosen such that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs the positive effect on the value score.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026), V.E. Proof of Honest Citation Equilibrium (Theorem 3b), p. 15
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

Holds when

validators rate citation honesty lower when self-citation is inflated

Classification

conditionsupport: arguedeconomicscitation-and-knowledge

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