kaal:claim:6421319-021

If probabilistic AI agents cannot reliably distinguish truth from fabrication, the lemons problem and signaling games retain relevance, but the asymmetry relocates: it now runs between agents that can verify AI output and those that cannot.

If probabilistic AI agents cannot reliably distinguish truth from fabrication, then Akerlof's lemons problem and Spence's signaling games retain their relevance. Only now the asymmetry is between agents that can verify AI output and those that cannot.

Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026), V.D. The Hallucination Objection: Residual Imperfection and the Persistence of Signaling, p. 20
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319

• applies during the transitional period of probabilistic AI systems with residual hallucination

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Verification Capability Asymmetryfamily: information-asymmetrydisclosure

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