Synthesizing Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Folk Theorems, and incomplete-contract theory implies that any fixed governance rule set is eventually dominated, so durable cooperation requires architecture that governs its own evolution.
Source quote, verbatim
Read together, these results imply that any fixed governance rule set is eventually dominated, and that durable cooperation therefore requires architecture that governs its own evolution
From
Wulf A. Kaal, From Neoclassical to Computative Labor: Foundations for a Testable Theory of Reputation Governance in the Agent Economy (2026), II. The Foundational Theorem, p. 1 https://ssrn.com/abstract=6890879 · source PDF
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Wulf A. Kaal, From Neoclassical to Computative Labor: Foundations for a Testable Theory of Reputation Governance in the Agent Economy (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6890879
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