kaal:claim:7260278-040

The Folk Theorem is permissive: it establishes that cooperative equilibria exist under the engineered conditions, not that the population selects them.

The Folk Theorem is permissive: it establishes that cooperative equilibria exist under the engineered conditions, not that the population selects them.

Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026), IX.B. Non-Reliance and Limitations, p. 18
https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278

• the architecture is evaluated apart from empirical equilibrium selection

conditionsupport: arguedinstitutional-designrisk-and-incentivesai-and-agents

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• Extension: Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games