kaal:claim:7322599-015

False freezes tax honest release value and worsen the release-clock wedge's own admission condition, so challenger bonds, standing rules, and other anti-griefing measures are design candidates whose effects require separate modeling.

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False freezes are priced inside the same composites: they tax honest release value, relax the participation floor, and can help the exit constraint only in the badly filed regime. Within the model, griefing therefore worsens the wedge’s own admission condition; challenger bonds, standing rules, and other anti-griefing measures are design candidates whose effects require separate modeling.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026), 5 The filing floor and the release-clock wedge, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599 · source PDF

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Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

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mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designconsensus-and-security

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