kaal:claim:7456999-036

Repeated-game cooperation results require persistent identity, patient agents, observable deviations, and enforceable punishments, none of which RLRF presently establishes.

Source quote, verbatim
Repeated-game results (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) may become relevant if persistent identity, sufficiently patient agents, observable deviations, and enforceable punishments are independently established. RLRF presently establishes none of those conditions. Non-transferability alone is not sufficient for Sybil resistance.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Reinforcement Learning from Reputation Feedback (2026), III.B Non-Transferability and the Inalienability Constraint, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=7456999 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Reinforcement Learning from Reputation Feedback (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7456999

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: assertedeconomicsreputationresearch-methods

Verify

The quote above is an exact passage from the source PDF, whose sha256 is 01016fbbcc25cad205cebd59ea686d8dfee8ae9b632095d86ba6c9a900456a4b.
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7456999-036.md | sha256sum