entity · derived
Counterparty risk
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying counterparty-risk. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1558614-021 : Because U.S. companies historically financed themselves through markets rather than through each other, U.S. managers are less attuned to risks accumulating at other firms, a blind spot that mattered
- 1806252-003 : Building on the increase in capital requirements for counterparty risk already suggested in Basel III, Basel III could add a charge on banks' assets based on their lending exposure to hedge funds.
- 2470008-031 : The interpretation Form PF demands generated particular concern among filers about the definition of counterparties and about counterparty performance measures.
- 2470008-035 : The Form PF counterparty questions most affected by filer interpretation, Questions 22 and 23, are the very ones the FSOC uses in stage two to determine the interconnectedness of private funds.
- 2714974-008 : Some of the most sensitive Form PF disclosures are not readily obtainable by the funds themselves: counterparty credit exposure often cannot be determined by individual fund managers, which makes the
- 2714974-025 : There are no legal limits on hedge fund leverage; the only constraint comes from market discipline supplied by creditors and counterparties through interest rates, credit availability, credit limits,
- 2748096-007 : Post-LTCM counterparty credit risk management, in which regulators pressed banks to monitor and limit the leverage of their hedge fund clients, appears to have worked: the Amaranth failure produced no
- 2748096-015 : Pre-crisis regulatory attention was misallocated: although Bernanke identified failure to manage counterparty risk as the primary cause for concern, the SEC and the Senate Banking Committee concentrat
- 2998097-004 : Banks overexposed themselves to private investment fund lending, which allowed LTCM and similar funds to grow significantly and led banks as counterparties to put their own existence at risk.
- 3396522-039 : Near instant settlement with stable cryptocurrencies removes counterparty risk, and the resulting reduction in counterparty risk boosts consumer confidence and increases transactional certainty relati
- 3396542-002 : In the traditional insurance structure, financial distress or bankruptcy of an individual underwriter harms consumers, who lose the protection of their insurance contract and must seek new coverage.
- 3405401-016 : Trust between counterparties in decentralized systems can only limitedly be assured by smart contracts, because the contract cannot verify the underlying qualities or future conduct of the parties.
- 3405401-017 : Smart contracts leave counterparty information asymmetries unresolved: the tenant of a smart property cannot fully know whether the landlord is providing a worthy property, and the landlord cannot kno
- 3405660-023 : Indirect regulation asks banks to fully assess the risk they incur from hedge fund counterparties, but that assessment is often dubious at best because of the opacity of hedge fund activity.
- 3405660-024 : Any risk assessment of hedge funds as counterparties is necessarily incomplete, because there is no common measure for calculating leverage and exposure and because fund trading strategies are dynamic
- 3405660-035 : Indirect regulation makes ex post opportunism by hedge funds less likely because the financial intermediaries, not just the funds, stand to lose reputation and market position if their counterparty ri
- 3411110-003 : Blockchain reduces counterparty credit risk through a specific mechanism: a single shared ledger compresses the settlement cycle so that cash or securities are verifiably in the account within seconds
- 3411110-014 : Any settlement completed in less than ten seconds removes counterparty risk and with it systemic risk entirely, which makes settlement speed, not disclosure, the operative variable for systemic risk.
- 3411110-015 : If blockchain pushes settlement finality into the seconds range, the entire regulatory infrastructure built to address counterparty and systemic risk would have to be reformed, and most systemic risk
- 3808852-024 : Conflicts of interest and counterparty risks are absent on a decentralized exchange because proprietary trading intermediaries such as market makers and centralized third-party operators cannot inject
- 3936876-013 : Centralized cryptocurrency exchanges require users to hand over their assets and then act as custodian, issuing what are essentially IOUs for users to trade with on the platform.
- 3936876-034 : Credit risk is low in digital asset transactions because the transactions are made instantaneously, which removes the counterparty performance window that generates credit risk in traditional custody.
- 3949098-019 : Reputation non fungible token staking removes counterparty risk because the desire to preserve and increase reputation scores dominates DAOIC decision making, making bad actors less likely to appear s