entity · derived
Hedge funds
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying hedge-funds. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1806252-007 : Hedge fund managers subjected to stricter rules in one jurisdiction while competing with funds in less restrictive jurisdictions could be placed at a comparative disadvantage.
- 1806252-009 : Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuable to competitors in the same markets, such leakag
- 1806252-019 : Because the AIFM Directive exposes depositaries to strict liability in certain circumstances, depositaries must weigh the risks and benefits of serving EU alternative investment funds, and a negative
- 1806252-022 : Although hedge funds manage only a small proportion of the investment universe compared with banks, they do manage a proportionally large part of complex financial instruments such as CDOs and other d
- 1806252-023 : British Bankers' Association data show that since 2000 hedge funds steadily increased their share of the credit derivatives market while banks' role in that market progressively declined.
- 1806252-034 : Without the threat of systemic risk and without a clear delineation of the social externalities that hedge funds cause, the purpose of direct hedge fund regulation is unclear.
- 1908473-026 : Sequential triggers invite manipulation of the triggering events and abusive practices such as asset stripping near bankruptcy, a risk the contract or corporate charter can counter by imposing a manda
- 2150377-001 : Freedom from supervision and disclosure obligations was functional rather than incidental for hedge funds: it enabled successful fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors,
- 2150377-002 : The immediate deregistration of hedge fund advisers following Goldstein v. SEC is revealed-preference evidence of the industry's opposition to registration and disclosure requirements, not merely a te
- 2348463-001 : There is a substantial overlap between the systemic risk disclosure requirements imposed on hedge fund advisers under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the disclosure requirements under the fully rev
- 2348463-003 : Hedge funds' distressed and default debt investments in the United States grew dramatically over two decades, rising from roughly $70 billion in 1998 to roughly $867 billion in 2007.
- 2348463-006 : The threat of systemic risk disclosure, combined with rising competition in the distressed-debt market, could further incentivize hedge fund managers to cooperate in the bankruptcy process.
- 2348463-030 : The threat that hedge fund managers' systemic risk filings could be publicly disclosed could help incentivize hedge fund investors to abstain from trading while serving on a creditors' committee and t
- 2389416-001 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act represents the most significant regulatory change in the history of the hedge fund industry, imposing mandatory adviser registration and disclosure for the first time si
- 2389416-004 : Strategic behavior by fund advisers around the assets under management registration threshold produces a strong increase in the measured discontinuity at that threshold.
- 2389416-006 : Analyst estimates place the annual cost of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure compliance for hedge fund advisers in a range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year.
- 2389416-012 : The working sample consists of 2,145 hedge funds drawn from Morningstar data on roughly 7,000 hedge funds and more than 3,700 advisers, retaining only funds reporting complete monthly earnings and AUM
- 2389416-013 : Only about a fifth of the sample funds exceed the $150 million AUM registration threshold: roughly 79 percent of the 2,145 funds are below it, 17 percent are consistently above it, and 4 percent float
- 2389416-014 : Most of the 87 strategic funds keep their AUM very close to the $150 million disclosure threshold, oscillating around it rather than moving decisively above or below it.
- 2389416-030 : Unlike the entire sample, whose discontinuity coefficient is near zero except in March 2012, the strategic subsample shows a discontinuity coefficient that is always above zero across the sample month
- 2389423-001 : This study finds no evidence of an inverse relationship between the size of regulated hedge fund advisers and the per-unit cost of compliance, contrary to the common complaint that financial regulatio
- 2389423-002 : The cost of Title IV compliance, and the other independent variables used as proxies for compliance cost, are associated with the size of hedge fund advisers as measured by assets under management.
- 2389423-003 : Anecdotal evidence suggests that Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act more than doubled the market entry threshold requirements for smaller hedge fund advisers.
- 2389423-004 : Before Title IV, launching a hedge fund could be accomplished by raising roughly $25 to $50 million, whereas after the Dodd-Frank Act the required initial amount may have risen to around $100 million.
- 2389423-005 : Below $100 million in initial assets under management, the administrative cost of running a hedge fund in a post Dodd-Frank environment could be prohibitive.
- 2389423-007 : A disproportionate effect of Title IV on startup hedge funds and smaller advisers could create barriers to market entry and precipitate a trend toward consolidation among smaller hedge fund advisers.
- 2389423-010 : Because there is no evidence of an inverse relationship between adviser size and per-unit compliance cost, industry concerns over the effect of Title IV compliance cost and possible barriers to entry
- 2389423-014 : The study's core hypothesis, drawn from the industry view and the anecdotal evidence, is that smaller hedge fund advisers pay more relative to their size than larger hedge fund advisers for Title IV c
- 2389423-015 : Prior work shows that registration and the increased compliance requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act only marginally increase the cost structure of hedge funds.
- 2389423-018 : Because Form PF requires less information from single strategy advisers, hedge fund advisers that apply only a single strategy to their portfolios may incur overall lower compliance cost.
- 2389423-024 : In the open ended survey question on the effects of Title IV, 43.59 percent of respondents, the largest group, said the industry would be affected predominantly by increased costs.
- 2389423-025 : The majority of survey respondents believed that Title IV compliance costs $100,000.00 annually.
- 2389423-026 : The most common fund adviser response, at 47.67 percent of the 86 respondents to the question, estimates the annual compliance cost of Title IV in the range of $50,000 to $100,000.
- 2389423-027 : On the median annual time measure for Title IV compliance, 46 percent of respondents estimated between 100 and 250 hours per year and 32 percent estimated between 250 and 500 hours per year.
- 2389423-028 : The clear majority of respondents prefer an asset size above the $150 million AUM registration threshold after the enactment of Title IV, indicating that advisers respond to the threshold by growing p
- 2389423-029 : The compliance and administrative costs created by Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act are associated with the size of hedge fund advisers' assets under management.
- 2389423-031 : Compliance costs per unit of AUM do not diminish in the entire sample or in the multi strategy subsample, so there is no support for the hypothesis that smaller advisers bear relatively higher Title I
- 2389423-034 : The results suggest that the private fund industry may be more robust and less affected by financial regulation than other financial services providers.
- 2389423-036 : While all coefficients are positive in the entire sample and the multi strategy subsample, the negative coefficients in the single strategy subsample suggest that the strategy employed by a hedge fund
- 2470008-003 : Prior studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that the data collection mandated by Form PF could itself create problems for the FSOC when it evaluates hedge fund systemic risk.
- 2470008-005 : The systemic risk of hedge funds arises principally from the combination of aggressive investment strategies and high leverage with adverse price movements that can dry up credit and depress the marke
- 2470008-006 : Hedge funds threaten the financial system through two distinct channels: directly, by damaging systemically important financial institutions, and indirectly, by generating liquidity shocks and raising
- 2470008-012 : National regulators reached opposite conclusions on the same question: unlike the OFR, FSB and IOSCO, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority concluded from its first comprehensive survey of
- 2470008-013 : The absence of financial market repercussions from the Amaranth failure suggests that indirect regulation of private funds, achieved by having regulators press banks to limit leverage extended to thei
- 2714974-001 : The originators of the earliest U.S. hedge funds deliberately structured the funds to maximize trading freedom by minimizing exposure to federal regulation, so the industry's private, unregistered for
- 2714974-004 : Expanding the client counting safe harbor in 1997 to cover legal entities generally allowed investment advisers to manage large amounts of securities indirectly for several hundred investors across mu
- 2714974-024 : The emergence of hedge funds as short sellers should be viewed as a positive development because it eliminates some of the market overpricing that the high costs of short selling would otherwise susta
- 2714974-030 : Proposals for indirect regulation of hedge funds through the regulation of the financial institutions that interact with them are unlikely to become legally binding.
- 2714974-031 : Banks are uniquely positioned to discipline hedge fund behavior because their role as lenders, market makers, and product creators lets them use the threat of cutting off future lending as leverage ov
- 2715083-001 : Confluence between mutual and hedge funds runs in two directions at once: mutual funds are converging on hedge funds along the dimension of investment strategy, while hedge funds are converging on mut
- 2715083-005 : The private fund industry grew 26 percent between 2013 and 2015, rising from just over 2 trillion dollars of assets under management to 2.7 trillion dollars.
- 2715083-010 : Operating a mutual fund is materially more capital intensive than operating a hedge fund: the mutual fund adviser's required investment in trading and operational technology and in specialized staffin
- 2715083-012 : Hedge fund investors have almost no statutory remedy: the regime establishing a hedge fund investor's rights is severely limited, nearly to the point of nonexistence, in the United States and in the o
- 2715083-016 : Freedom from significant regulatory oversight is what historically enabled hedge funds to run more exotic, more leveraged strategies aimed at absolute returns.
- 2715083-025 : For the first time in the industry's history, the Dodd-Frank Act required most hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC, mandating disclosure of information previously treated as proprietary and p
- 2732915-013 : The SEC estimates that 230 U.S. hedge fund advisers with at least $1.5 billion in RAUM attributable to hedge funds at the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter will file Form PF.
- 2732915-015 : Form PF data from the SEC Risk and Examinations Office for the fourth quarter of 2014 show net asset value of about $3,399 billion for hedge funds, $2,672 billion for Qualifying Hedge Funds, and $1,74
- 2739479-001 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act ended more than fifty years during which the hedge fund industry operated under low-level regulatory oversight, constituting a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework
- 2739479-007 : As the private fund investor profile shifts toward institutional investors, fees fall; institutional investors made up 65 percent of hedge fund AUM in 2015 compared with roughly 20 percent a decade ea
- 2739479-016 : The traditional distinction between mutual funds and private funds is dissipating: mutual funds are becoming more like hedge funds in investment strategy, while hedge funds are becoming more like mutu
- 2748096-001 : Government assessments of hedge fund systemic risk conflict directly: the OFR, FSB, and IOSCO treat private fund activities as important threats to the financial system, while the UK Financial Service
- 2748096-002 : Despite conflicting government reports, the weight of post-crisis evidence from leading financial economists supports the conclusion that hedge funds introduce at least some systemic risk into the fin
- 2748096-003 : Public perception, rather than measured risk, is the principal driver of the hedge fund systemic risk debate and of the policy responses to it, and that perception is shaped chiefly by industry growth
- 2748096-004 : Hedge fund assets under management grew from $118 billion at the end of 1997 to more than $2.7 trillion by the end of 2014, a compound annual growth rate of 19 percent.
- 2748096-006 : Because hedge fund losses are absorbed directly by a large and dispersed body of investors and their equity capital, private fund advisers are unlikely to trigger a systemic event, and their activity
- 2748096-013 : Hedge funds' risk management practices are typically evolved enough to constitute a major barrier to systemic shocks, and their trading counterparties and lenders further help prevent losses large eno
- 2748096-014 : Hedge fund losses large enough to affect the overall economy did not appear until after the crisis and recession had already been triggered by the mortgage market collapse and sustained stock market l
- 2748096-017 : The performance pressure on hedge fund managers incentivizes them to take disproportionately high risks in order to deliver sufficient client returns, and those disproportionate risks translate into p
- 2748096-022 : Concern about hedge fund leverage is empirically overstated: since the collapse of LTCM in 1998 the industry's exposure to leverage has been relatively modest, especially compared with the mean levera
- 2748096-032 : Although hedge fund return volatility is less sensitive to financial system risks than that of brokers, banks, and insurance companies, nonlinear Granger causality tests show that between 2001 and 200
- 2748096-039 : Hedge funds have the potential both to amplify and to mitigate systemic risk, and which effect dominates turns on their particular risk management incentives, leverage, and investment strategies, whic
- 2811729-002 : Unconstrained mutual funds share multiple investment strategy and risk attributes with fixed income hedge funds, a finding the authors ground in trading data and prospectuses of all such funds launche
- 2959730-011 : In the Buffett and Seides wager on net of fee returns, the passive S&P 500 index position produced a 7.1% compounded annual return after nine years against 2.2% for the five hedge funds of funds, evid
- 2959730-026 : Blockchain based fund reporting substitutes verifiable transparency for hedge fund secrecy: the LendingRobot ledger shows detailed holdings and supplies a hash code signature as evidence that the data
- 2998097-027 : The threat of public disclosure of systemic risk filings through the bankruptcy process only marginally affected hedge funds' tactics and their role in distressed investing, because disclosure obligat
- 2998097-033 : Confluence runs in both directions: mutual funds are becoming more like hedge funds as a matter of investment strategy, while hedge funds are becoming more like mutual funds as a matter of regulatory
- 3002908-035 : Fund type composition diverges across regions: in the United States hedge funds dominate the blockchain using sample, while in Europe venture capital funds clearly predominate.
- 3409548-001 : Hedge fund managers adopt emerging technology because it converts into a fee premium: technology driven outperformance makes them more competitive than other funds and financial institutions, which in
- 3409548-002 : The traditional 2 and 20 fee model has become increasingly difficult to justify, and embracing modern financial products is what allows managers to produce returns that still support that model.
- 3409548-005 : Systematic, computer model driven funds do not reliably outperform human managed funds: research finds the typical systematic fund does not always perform as well as funds run by human managers.
- 3409548-006 : Hedge funds that base their strategies on artificial intelligence have delivered better results than the industry average over the preceding five years.
- 3409548-020 : Blockchain-based funds can invert the traditional secrecy of hedge funds: the LendingRobot ledger discloses detailed holdings and supplies a hash code signature evidencing that the data is tamper proo