entity · derived
Market concentration
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying market-concentration. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3117224-015 : Switzerland ranks only fourth in the number of ICOs launched yet first in total funds raised, so the average Swiss ICO project raises a greater than average amount of funds.
- 3117224-016 : Switzerland's disproportionate share of ICO funds raised relative to ICO count is attributable to the fact that many of the world's most successful ICOs are launched there.
- 3396542-001 : Insurance underwriting as currently organized imposes significant costs and inefficiencies and erects high barriers to entry, and it provides no democratized access to the underwriting process or coll
- 4734750-006 : The 2024 code review market is dominated by a few centralized firms that can charge exorbitant, monopoly-like prices, and those high prices do not buy a sound process because the code review process i
- 4734750-015 : Market concentration among the top five audit firms itself creates high barriers to entry for new participants in the code review market.
- 4755632-024 : Centralization of the code review industry produces overpricing because clients will pay nearly any price to obtain the stamp of approval from one of the top five audit firms.
- 4755632-025 : Concentrated market power in code review undermines internal and external quality controls, leaving the public with no or very weak control over the quality of code review services, and it eliminates
- 4755632-026 : Because a limited number of players control the code review market and its outputs, the quality of code review is often suboptimal, and clients have little or no recourse when code proves flawed even
- 4796714-008 : Strict privacy and transparency regulation produces a perverse result: because only large technology companies hold the data resources and infrastructure needed to comply and still build effective AI,