entity · derived
Monetary policy
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying monetary-policy. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1998455-036 : If central banks were to purchase contingent capital securities issued by systemically important institutions in the primary or secondary market as part of monetary policy, the prospect of internalizi
- 2470008-009 : The unprecedented growth of the private fund industry combined with the low interest rate environment created by post crisis quantitative easing drove private fund managers to reach for yield.
- 3067615-009 : An issuer can pre-define monetary policy in crypto economics by fixing the number of tokens created and issued, and a maximum token issuance combined with controlled token supply releases can make sma
- 3067615-012 : Adjusting commercial benefits associated with a token issuance is preferable to blunt monetary intervention, because it avoids more drastic measures such as emergency sales, building token reserves, o
- 3249860-006 : In decentralized systems the functions previously performed by policy designers, central bankers, and economists in centralized markets are taken over by the token designer for the respective token ec
- 3249860-007 : The democratization of monetary policy in token economies creates a serious problem, because token designers lack the qualifications and institutional functions that centralized central banking distri
- 3249860-008 : An issuer's ICO strategy can pre-define the token economy's monetary policy by predetermining the fixed number of tokens created and issued in the ICO.
- 3249860-012 : Adjusting the commercial benefits of a token issuance lets the issuer avoid more drastic monetary interventions such as emergency sales, building token reserves, or changing the token supply in circul
- 3249860-013 : Combining quasi-fiscal policy, increasing benefits attached to tokens, with monetary policy, increasing supply in circulation, may or may not have an effect on the market price of the tokens.
- 3396522-001 : The unfettered discretion of fiat monetary policy makers can lead to arbitrary outcomes, because the overall value and stability of any fiat currency is contingent on the fluctuations and successes of
- 3396522-002 : Monetary policy making for fiat currencies largely lacks transparency, and that opacity prevents markets from taking anticipatory action on policy indicators.
- 3396522-023 : Central bank price stability is elusive for two structural reasons: central banks are constantly lobbied to move money supply away from equilibrium, and even absent lobbying they face information asym
- 3396522-024 : Stable cryptocurrencies escape part of the lobbying problem by hardcoding their policy rationales and outcomes into the protocol, which limits the amount of lobbying that can influence policy decision
- 3396522-025 : Because hardcoded cryptocurrency policy is transparent and therefore predictable, market participants can anticipate policy and adjust behavior in advance, and such anticipatory reactions could over t
- 3396522-026 : Full hardcoding is impossible: no stable cryptocurrency can encode all required policies and policy actions with full transparency, because future policy needs cannot be anticipated ex ante.
- 3396522-027 : Monetary policy for stable cryptocurrencies should combine hardcoded transparent rules with protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations, with decentralized but fully transparent policy D
- 3396522-028 : The authors qualify their own case: stable cryptocurrencies can experiment with monetary policy on an unprecedented scale only because they are insulated from real world complexities and political pos
- 3396522-040 : The authors adopt Schilling and Uhlig's result that official money and cryptocurrencies can co-exist in a manner consistent with stability, rejecting the framing that private currency and central bank
- 3402701-013 : Bonds are the appropriate burning mechanism for a temporary drop in currency price caused by larger economic instability such as an act of God or war, since bonds can be redeemed above their sale pric
- 3402701-027 : Holding taxes are the implicit result of inflation borne by coin holders, and they should be set to account for the inefficiencies of the economy rather than the inefficiencies of maintaining the curr
- 3402701-032 : The day-to-day stability mechanism can be fully automated by algorithm, but monetary and fiscal policy choices cannot be: the algorithm's parameters must be chosen by hand and adjusted regularly to ba
- 3402701-033 : Parameter and policy choices for a stable cryptocurrency should be made by a decentralized autonomous organization, the Stability DAO or SDAO, which functions as a transparent, decentralized, open ana
- 3402701-035 : Transparency is not an unqualified good for monetary policy: a currency only partially backed by reserves can be arbitraged by a Soros-style shorting strategy much more easily when the quantity of res
- 3606663-038 : Conducting monetary policy through a central bank digital currency imposes a requirement on the technology layer: the underlying network protocol must enable the central bank to adjust the money suppl
- 3782216-035 : Trying to hold a peg at an artificial level deters new adopters and punishes existing members, and is the most likely way to induce a death spiral that collapses a currency; after a fundamental change
- 4900878-021 : Economic incentive designs are the core of tokenomics: they govern issuance, distribution, and use of tokens by emulating traditional monetary and fiscal policy and adapting it to the distinctive feat
- 6421319-002 : Monetary policy instruments become ceremonial under AI driven production, because central banks inject liquidity on schedules calibrated for scarcity economies while production compounds exponentially