entity · derived
Private funds
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying private-funds. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2150377-012 : This Article reports the first survey study of hedge fund advisers conducted after the SEC's registration effective date, drawing on a population of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before Ma
- 2150377-022 : A majority of surveyed advisers, 72.09%, do not plan any strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements.
- 2150377-023 : Compliance with the registration and disclosure requirements cost a majority of surveyed advisers between $50,000 and $200,000, while a significant minority estimated total compliance cost from $200,0
- 2150377-032 : Registration and disclosure did not push advisers to change what they invest in: only 2.44% of respondents said they would have to change strategy significantly over five years, while 4.88% expressly
- 2389423-008 : A surplus of larger private fund advisers holding correspondingly larger amounts of assets under management could increase systemic risk, so a regulation that consolidates the industry may work agains
- 2389423-009 : The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information, a combination
- 2389423-023 : The analysis uses data from a 2012 survey study of a population of 1,264 private fund advisers registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds of March 30, 2012.
- 2389423-032 : The results contradict other studies finding an inverse relationship between the size of regulated firms and the per-unit cost of compliance, and suggest that financial regulation does not bring incre
- 2389423-033 : Financial regulation has disparate effects on private fund advisers in comparison with other financial services providers, so evidence of scale economies in compliance drawn from banking does not tran
- 2389423-034 : The results suggest that the private fund industry may be more robust and less affected by financial regulation than other financial services providers.
- 2389423-038 : There is no evidence that private fund adviser regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act increases returns to scale, which counters the most damning putative concern raised about regulatory complia
- 2447306-001 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC rules implementing it produced a paradigm shift in United States private fund regulation, raising regulatory oversight of an industry that had been largely e
- 2447306-002 : The Form PF filing obligation is triggered by a bright line asset threshold: every registered investment adviser with more than $150 million in assets under management attributable to private funds at
- 2447306-003 : Form PF's counterparty credit exposure requirement is difficult to satisfy at the source, because the exposure is highly sensitive information that individual fund managers often cannot readily determ
- 2447306-005 : Prior scholarship, including the author's own earlier work, established that Form PF created core challenges for the private fund industry but did not clarify what impact the disclosure requirements a
- 2447306-006 : High quality private fund data is scarce because the industry's entrenched interest in confidentiality combined with decades of regulatory exemption from registration and transparency requirements lef
- 2447306-012 : Initial Form PF compliance was inexpensive for most filers: 59.18 percent of respondents put the total cost of completing Form PF for the first time under $10,000.
- 2447306-019 : Form PF compliance is not staff intensive for most filers: 67.35 percent of respondents used only one to three individuals and 69.39 percent reported the work took staff less than 50 hours.
- 2447306-031 : Most private fund advisers did not need new infrastructure to comply: 65.22 percent reported that their existing internal reporting systems adequately capture the information Form PF requires.
- 2447306-033 : Form PF's counterparty disclosure proved far less burdensome in practice than anticipated: 93.75 percent of respondents encountered no difficulty identifying counterparties for the counterparty credit
- 2447306-036 : Investor demand for Form PF filings is limited: 74.47 percent of respondents had never been asked by an investor for a copy of their Form PF filing.
- 2447306-039 : The measured effect of Form PF data reporting on the private fund industry is milder than the pre-adoption debate predicted.
- 2470008-001 : The SEC data collected from private fund advisers feeds every stage of the FSOC's systemic risk assessment, and the FSOC leans most heavily on precisely those disclosure items that are the most proble
- 2470008-007 : The 2008 to 2009 financial crisis altered market conditions and the factors driving private fund systemic risk, which triggered a second, distinct wave of scholarship on private funds' systemic implic
- 2470008-008 : Some estimates place private funds ahead of banks in size and importance during and after the financial crisis.
- 2470008-009 : The unprecedented growth of the private fund industry combined with the low interest rate environment created by post crisis quantitative easing drove private fund managers to reach for yield.
- 2470008-010 : Because private fund advisers supply liquidity and perform liquidity transformation in the manner of banks, the vulnerabilities their bank like activities create can carry large consequences for finan
- 2470008-017 : Commonly managed investment funds holding $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets can be designated systemically important, and following a similar investment strategy across those
- 2470008-020 : The FSOC's three stage SIFI review process depends heavily on information that private fund investment advisers supply through Form PF.
- 2715083-005 : The private fund industry grew 26 percent between 2013 and 2015, rising from just over 2 trillion dollars of assets under management to 2.7 trillion dollars.
- 2732915-001 : Five years after the Dodd-Frank Act, the private fund industry is most affected by the uncertainty and the higher costs the Act generates, yet on multiple metrics the industry is coping well with the
- 2732915-002 : The private fund industry is adjusting well to the evolving post Dodd-Frank regulatory landscape, and the long-term impact of that landscape is much less intense than the industry itself initially ant
- 2732915-003 : The long-term cost implications of Title IV registration and reporting obligations are absorbed relatively quickly after registration, so that Dodd-Frank compliance costs are largely manageable depend
- 2732915-004 : Although the industry adapted well to the post Dodd-Frank environment, the Act has already produced some negative effects on the private fund industry and may produce further negative long-term effect
- 2739479-001 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act ended more than fifty years during which the hedge fund industry operated under low-level regulatory oversight, constituting a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework
- 2739479-003 : The reporting obligations imposed on private fund advisers by Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels.
- 2739479-005 : Growth in the private fund industry has been concentrated among the largest advisers: assets managed by advisers with more than $5 billion in AUM grew 141 percent, compared with 53 percent for firms b
- 2739479-006 : Private fund underperformance may be a product of institutionalization: pension funds have increased their private fund holdings and institutions now make up over two thirds of the private fund invest
- 2739479-008 : Underperformance combined with the influx of institutional money means that pension funds, endowments and other institutions, which now outnumber wealthy individuals as private fund investors, hold mo
- 2739479-010 : The private fund industry generated a disproportionate share of asset management profits: it produced 34 percent of the industry's 2013 profits, $31.2 billion of $93.0 billion, while controlling only
- 2739479-012 : The stronger performance of activist strategies lets activist private fund managers keep charging the higher 2 and 20 fee structure that other fund managers can no longer demand.
- 2739479-015 : Registered investment advisers should expect a more demanding regulatory environment ahead, including new or proposed regulations, more SEC enforcement actions against private fund managers, and longe
- 2739479-017 : Survey research on private fund advisers is structurally constrained because these advisers traditionally oppose publicity and hold a strong preference for confidentiality and privacy, which makes a s
- 2739479-018 : Neither the 2012 nor the 2015 sample is biased, and the comparison across the two populations is consistent because respondents in both surveys were equally subject to Title IV compliance obligations.
- 2739479-019 : The decline in survey response rate between 2012 and 2015 is itself evidence of the private fund industry's relatively rapid adaptation to the new statutory and regulatory regime.
- 2739479-020 : A majority of private fund adviser respondents in both surveys, 72 percent in 2012 and 75 percent in 2015, did not plan any strategic response, meaning any action to avoid or limit the impact of Title
- 2739479-021 : The share of advisers reporting that they changed their communications with investors nearly doubled from 25 percent in 2012 to 47 percent in 2015, a shift the author attributes to advisers increasing
- 2739479-023 : Rather than outsourcing required compliance work, the industry is on some metrics increasingly performing that work in-house, a shift consistent with the SEC's emphasis on compliance officer liability
- 2739479-024 : Between 2012 and 2015 the annual cost of Dodd-Frank compliance doubled for many survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range into the $100,000 to $200,000 range.
- 2739479-026 : If compliance hour requirements are treated as a proxy for compliance cost, the survey data indicate that the cost of complying with all federal regulation, not just Dodd-Frank, increased between 2012
- 2739479-027 : Private fund advisers increasingly factor the regulatory structure into decisions about the size of their assets under management, a shift partly explained by the higher post-Dodd-Frank cost structure
- 2739479-028 : The finding that advisers size AUM around regulatory cost is in tension with anecdotal evidence, since only a minority of private investment funds pay expenses out of the management fee at all.
- 2739479-029 : Advisers typically try to allocate as many operating expenses as possible to the fund so that as much of the net management fee as possible becomes manager compensation, a practice that private fund i
- 2739479-032 : A majority of respondents in both surveys, 76.1 percent in 2012 and 65 percent in 2015, believed the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect their reporting funds' earnings.
- 2739479-033 : Although Dodd-Frank compliance costs fall primarily on the investment adviser rather than the fund, advisers have increasingly built fund structures that pass most of those compliance expenses through
- 2739479-034 : Passing compliance costs through to reporting funds applies those costs against the funds' trading revenues, which produces an overall adverse impact on fund earnings and so shifts the burden of regul
- 2739479-035 : Among advisers who saw an earnings effect, the attributed cause shifted from direct expense to opportunity cost between 2012 and 2015, with opportunity cost references rising from 9 percent to 32 perc
- 2739479-036 : By 2015 a clear majority of respondents, 93 percent, attributed effects on their investment management company's profits to additional expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and no respondent re
- 2739479-037 : Even though the Dodd-Frank Act's overall regulatory impact on the private fund industry was low, the compliance costs generated by the evolving regulatory environment carry many unexpected consequence
- 2739479-039 : The comparative evidence suggests the long-term effects of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank regulatory environment may be more substantial than either the industry or regulators initially anticipated.
- 2748096-009 : Private fund advisers in the shadow banking system perform bank-like functions, providing liquidity to clients and to financial markets and engaging in various forms of liquidity transformation, and t
- 2811718-001 : The study rests on two datasets: SEC Form ADV Part II filings by private investment fund advisers from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392) and the publicly available litigation record on private fund investor due
- 2811718-002 : The private fund industry grew by 26 percent between 2013 and 2015, rising from just above 2 trillion dollars in assets under management to 2.7 trillion dollars.
- 2811718-007 : Because a material omission or misstatement in Form ADV Part 2A can support a serious securities law charge, private fund managers have an incentive to keep the narrative language of that required dis
- 2811718-037 : Lacking standards for private fund investor due diligence can partly be attributed to private funds' unique market position: unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities free fr
- 2811729-004 : Unconstrained mutual funds combine the regulatory structure of a mutual fund with the investment strategy of a private fund implementing a credit strategy and principally trading fixed income instrume
- 2811729-016 : If a private fund's offering process successfully limits its investors to accredited investors or qualified purchasers, the retail investor protection principles of the Company Act do not apply to the
- 2811729-024 : The high turnover rate of unconstrained mutual funds distinguishes them from other mutual funds and makes them directly comparable to private funds, which typically trade at high levels.
- 2811729-025 : Unconstrained mutual funds engaged in almost 50 percent more futures contract transactions than other mutual funds, and the overall scope and nature of their derivative use is consistent with what the
- 2811729-026 : Because unconstrained mutual funds share investment strategy and risk attributes with private funds, the average unconstrained fund's risk profile is substantially more complex and generally involves
- 2811729-027 : Unconstrained mutual funds take on private fund-like risk without a corresponding return advantage: private funds' incentives and investment flexibility help explain their performance advantage over m
- 2811729-036 : The Company Act's retail investor protection policies do not take sufficiently into account the investment strategy and risk attributes that unconstrained mutual funds share with private funds.
- 2816408-001 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 is the most significant regulatory change in the history of the private fund industry, ending decades in which the industry operated with little regulatory super
- 2816408-002 : Attempts to rescind Title IV through the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 demonstrate that private fund registration and disclosure obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act are highly politic
- 2816408-011 : Estimates of annual Dodd-Frank Act compliance cost for private fund advisers range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year.
- 2816408-015 : Beyond the authors' own prior work, there is no other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.
- 2959730-001 : Private fund advisers' increasing use of blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, and big data is a distinct source of downward pressure on the traditional 2/20 fee structure that commentators
- 2959730-002 : The majority of private fund advisers that deploy blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, and big data in their operations or strategy charge their investors lower fees, even though not all bl
- 2959730-003 : Using a hand coded dataset of 98 private investment fund advisers that use blockchain technology in their strategy or internal operations, the article shows that advisers using the new technology are
- 2959730-012 : Private investment fund management fees deviate from the market rate of 1.5% to 2% of the fund's capital commitments because affiliates and other employees of the investment manager who invest in the
- 2959730-042 : The rise of blockchain applications in private investment funds can exacerbate the industry's already changing fee structure.
- 2998033-013 : The SEC's reasoning against the Bitcoin exchange traded fund does not transfer to blockchain based private investment funds, because such funds trade a diverse array of cryptocurrencies rather than Bi
- 2998033-027 : Private fund management fees have compressed materially: the historical two percent of commitments has shifted in recent years to roughly 1.0 percent for new managers and 1.5 to 1.8 percent for establ
- 2998033-035 : The study rests on a hand coded dataset of 120 private investment funds that use blockchain technology in either their strategy or their operations, compiled by the author and research assistants from
- 2998033-040 : Regulatory guidance is essential to the continuing evolution and blockchain integration of the private investment fund industry, so the constraint on further adoption is regulatory rather than technol
- 3002908-013 : The IRS confined its virtual currency position to transactions in convertible virtual currency, which leaves the tax treatment of crypto limited partnership interests unaddressed.
- 4033886-012 : Digital asset fund valuation disputes are aggravated by nondisclosure: Polychain Capital told a redeeming investor that the fund's asset valuation policy would not be disclosed.