entity · derived
Protocol upgrade
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying protocol-upgrade. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3441904-005 : Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocol
- 3441904-006 : Without evolutionary governance upgrades to blockchain protocols, the cost reduction that blockchain brings to the agency relationship cannot be maintained.
- 3441904-014 : The core governance failure of the original 2016 DAO was its inability to create dynamic governance protocol upgrades in real time through dynamic feedback loops, because its voting structure was buil
- 3441904-024 : Hard forks can reintroduce the double spend problem, because wallets, merchants, and users running the previous code deem the new code invalid and cannot detect spending on it, so coins spent in a new
- 3441904-033 : Rulemaking via code is not itself a cure for static regulation, because coded solutions are subject to natural flaws such as bugs and cannot evolutionarily change protocols, making them another stable
- 3441904-040 : On chain governance is a necessity for most public blockchains because all existing blockchains need to calibrate soft forks for protocol upgrades.
- 3799320-034 : Precedent in the DAO of DAOs is replaced dynamically: if a newer template is referenced more often it becomes the prevailing precedent, while the old precedent dissipates over time through non use.
- 3808873-033 : Decentralized networks depend on dynamic governance because evolving blockchain protocols require updates, and the practice of hardforking that remained prevalent in the early 2020s created significan