kaal:claim:3441904-005

Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocols.

Existing blockchain governance still mainly consist of forking a given chain. Even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice.

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019), I. Introduction, p. 7
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

• existing blockchain governance that relies on forks

failuresupport: arguedfailure: forking-as-governancefamily: governance-participation-collapseconsensus-and-securityblockchaingovernance-designdao

• restates kaal:claim:3373393-039 Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols, ...
• supported_by kaal:claim:3782203-010 Because a group sometimes genuinely has no consensus to be discovered, network forking is at times inevitable ...

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• Qualification: Proof-of-Friendship Consensus Mechanism for Resilient Blockchain Technology
• Qualification: Accountability Protocols? On-chain Dynamics in Blockchain Governance