failure family

compliance cost and barrier to entry

34 claims across 23 works.

• inflated-issuer-liability: Applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 together with the fraud on the market theory substantially increases the potential liability of issuers and can
• litigation-cost-pass-through: If Congress enacts section 7216, EU investors will on the whole probably earn a lower return on their investments than they otherwise would, because t
• Non-systemic banks pay for a fund they cannot draw on: The German bank levy is internally inconsistent because financial institutions without systemic relevance must contribute to the reorganization fund y
• foundation-requirement-burden: The WCAM requirement that a court approved foundation pursue the action makes the Dutch regime more burdensome than the U.S. system, which requires on
• registration-raises-barriers-to-entry: Respondents identified the creation of barriers to entry as an industry level effect of the registration and disclosure requirements, because the rule
• startup-capital-threshold-quadrupled: The compliance burden has raised the minimum viable scale for launching a hedge fund: an adviser reports that the capital needed to start a fund in Ne
• generic-compliance-advice-fails: Generic industry advice on building an effective compliance program cannot work in practice because it is written to apply to many firms at once while
• prohibitive administrative cost below the $100 million AUM threshold: Below $100 million in initial assets under management, the administrative cost of running a hedge fund in a post Dodd-Frank environment could be prohi
• Formally identical rules with divergent practical burden: Identical rules diverge in practice because the two vehicle types are structured, operated, and run as businesses differently; the Investment Advisers
• Best execution burden asymmetry: Best execution is a leading instance of nominal confluence: the obligation is nominally the same, but it is far more complicated and burdensome for th
• industry-burden-claim-unsupported: The evidence contradicts the private fund industry's claim that private fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects private
• Verification liability chills use of Rule 506(c): The investor verification requirement defeats the purpose of the Rule 506(c) liberalization: fearing liability for investor misrepresentations of pers
• Compliance cost entry barrier: Higher compliance costs from hedge fund regulation can create barriers to entry for new market entrants and can accelerate consolidation of the hedge
• Regressive compliance burden: Smaller private funds spend more on compliance than larger ones, both as a share of AUM and relative to operating costs, which means increasing regula
• Compliance cost pass-through to investors: Passing compliance costs through to reporting funds applies those costs against the funds' trading revenues, which produces an overall adverse impact
• Regulatory barriers to entry for small firms: Barriers to entry for small firms are becoming an increasing problem in the private fund industry under the evolving post-Dodd-Frank legal environment
• Disproportionate burden on smaller advisers: Up to $100,000 in additional Dodd-Frank compliance cost is a significant imposition on a smaller private fund adviser, whereas larger and mid sized ad
• Regulatory cost as entry barrier: The long-term effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry is likely to be characterized by increasing additional expenses and
• Clarification generates uncertainty and cost: The same SEC implementation and clarification of Dodd-Frank registration and reporting requirements that helps the industry comply also creates uncert
• notary-layer-transaction-costs: Because of the fees attached to its extra verification layer, the OpenBazaar dispute resolution mechanism creates substantial transaction costs that p
• Clarification generates its own uncertainty and cost: The SEC's efforts to clarify and optimize the post Dodd-Frank framework cut both ways: they supported industry compliance with the revised standards w
• Scale economies in compliance as barrier to entry: Because Title IV compliance costs bring increasing returns to scale and therefore favor larger firms, Title IV may create barriers to entry for smalle
• ATS compliance cost barrier: The compliance burden attached to operating an alternative trading system, including fees, consumer protection, examination, and books and records req
• overbreadth spillover: Additional direct limitations on hedge funds spill over onto other private investment pools such as venture capital funds and structured financings, w
• securities law capital constraint: Under current securities laws, DAOs governed solely by smart contracts are restricted in their ability to pool assets and generate profit, because tho
• compliance cost consolidation: Strict privacy and transparency regulation produces a perverse result: because only large technology companies hold the data resources and infrastruct
• decentralized compliance verification gap: Managing machine learning assets and complying with laws such as GDPR and CCPA becomes significantly harder under decentralized governance, because di
• compliance driven incumbent consolidation: Although the move toward more explainable, private, and transparent AI is desirable, Kaal argues these regulations paradoxically consolidate power wit
• sector wide regulatory compliance gap: The average regulatory compliance score across the sampled DAOs is 3.22, ranging from 1 to 9, and the distribution shows that many DAOs struggle with
• experimental-rule-uncertainty: Experimental rules impose a cost on the regulated: because the rules are temporary and subject to change, they complicate compliance efforts, disrupt
• compliance-induced data scarcity: The governance protocols required for GDPR and AI Act compliance, including anonymization, data minimization, and explicit consent, themselves complic
• regulatory perimeter drift: Any drift toward transferability, voucher redemption at par, yield, or marketplace functionality would push LER into MiCA compliance obligations and,
• disproportionality invalidation: Delaware fiduciary standards create litigation exposure for LER: if distributions are judged disproportionate under Unocal or Blasius, boards face cou
• MiCA non-compliance exposure: MiCA complicates cross-border LER adoption because non-compliance exposes issuers to administrative fines of up to three percent of annual turnover.