kaal:position:2026-07-31-7346
Beyond Technical Compliance III: From Designed Fragilities to Cooperative AI-Whose Intentions, Whose Governance? presents the following source proposition: If the failures documented in the companion papers are designed, the question becomes: what should be designed instead-and by whom, with what intentions? This proposition is pertinent to Kaal's source-bound claim that Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds than securities buyers have over rating agencies and their ratings. The proposed response is an extension: the relationship should remain limited to the retrieved source proposition and the mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.
ai-and-agentscorporate-governancesystemic-riskcompliancerisk-and-incentiveshistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref