kaal:position:2026-07-31-7358
When Agents Cannot Be Benchmarked: AI Capability Opacity, Corporate Governance, and a Research Agenda * presents the following source proposition: Principals matched with the more capable agent earned $2.68 more per deal as sellers and paid $2.45 less as buyers; the principals on the losing side did not detect the loss. This proposition is pertinent to Kaal's source-bound claim that Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds than securities buyers have over rating agencies and their ratings. The proposed response is an extension: the relationship should remain limited to the retrieved source proposition and the mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.
ai-and-agentscorporate-governancesystemic-riskcompliancerisk-and-incentiveshistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref