kaal:position:2026-07-31-7772

Empirical Analysis of Reputation-aware Task Delegation by Humans from a Multi-agent Game presents the following source proposition: What are the strategies people adopt when deciding how to delegated tasks to agents when the agents' reputation and productivity information is available? This proposition is pertinent to Kaal's source-bound claim that Honesty would be the wrong strategy for an agent if the contract were anonymous and its resolution did not affect future contracts, because that situation is a single-stage zero-sum game in which stealing all the entrusted wealth is optimal. The proposed response is an extension: the relationship should remain limited to the retrieved source proposition and the mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.

• The response is limited to the retrieved source proposition and mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.
• External evidence level: abstract indexed.
• Mapping review tier: moderate-confidence claim review.
• Primary mapping confidence: 0.3703.
• The source-to-claim mapping remains explicitly ambiguous and is published with that limitation.

Empirical Analysis of Reputation-aware Task Delegation by Humans from a Multi-agent Game

kaal:claim:3782193-031
Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193
Source PDF sha256: 74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2

Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: moderate-confidence claim review
Mapping confidence: 0.3703
Mapping ambiguous: true

economicsai-and-agentscorporate-governancereputationhistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-07-31:streaming-etl-0010 on 2026-07-31. Review record.

Canonical markdown sha256: 11b3c8c0124c1f034757e5648c3cb6d47044fbaebf06d4dafd8718e0f0617e43
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-7772.md | sha256sum