Qualification: Avoiding the Anticommons Tragedy in Canadian Securities Regulation

Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-108 · 2026-08-08

Avoiding the Anticommons Tragedy in Canadian Securities Regulation attributes higher regulatory costs to provincial regulators that fail to internalize the effects of their actions on the wider market. This supplies a concrete negative externality that qualifies Kaal's account of competition between legislators as a quality-sensitive feedback mechanism. The abstract does not show that all jurisdictional competition produces an anticommons.

Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate

Avoiding the Anticommons Tragedy in Canadian Securities Regulation

Scholarly basis

kaal:claim:2267560-030
Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
Source PDF sha256: 7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af

Evidence and mapping

Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: substantively reviewed abstract-level qualification
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false

Topics

economicsinstitutional-designhistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref

Provenance

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0011-remainder-0002-oldest-0050-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.

Verify

Canonical markdown sha256: f47b4cd0748531a4647fc73f3248142e727e7c4c79198c8bb0ff4b7508d5415e
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-108.md | sha256sum