Extension: Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders

Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-207 · 2026-08-08

Proxy favors reports that the reciprocity relationship between firms and institutional dual holders does not exist when confidential proxy voting is in place. This supplies a concrete governance-control mechanism for one conflict channel consistent with Kaal's broader principal-agent misalignment claim. The abstract does not show that confidentiality removes residual agency loss generally.

Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate

Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders

Scholarly basis

kaal:claim:3373393-009
Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
Source PDF sha256: 4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e

Evidence and mapping

Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: substantively reviewed abstract-level extension
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false

Topics

corporate-governancecompliancehistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref

Provenance

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0022-oldest-0050-0002-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.

Verify

Canonical markdown sha256: 65604ce094f638508553250062c83a3fac57ae262291e984ecbf2d718ed5d749
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-207.md | sha256sum