Extension: The Differential Effect of Regulatory Signals on Shareholder Dissent: The Case of Shareholder Voting in Director Elections

Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-209 · 2026-08-08

The Differential Effect of Regulatory Signals on Shareholder Dissent finds that a disclosure-rule change affected shareholder dissent differently as domestic versus foreign institutional ownership increased. This supplies an empirical example of institution-specific reactions to regulatory information relevant to Kaal's dynamic-rulemaking mechanism. The abstract does not establish that the regulator used the response as feedback or adjusted a later rule.

Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate

The Differential Effect of Regulatory Signals on Shareholder Dissent: The Case of Shareholder Voting in Director Elections

Scholarly basis

kaal:claim:2273857-049
Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
Source PDF sha256: e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a

Evidence and mapping

Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: substantively reviewed abstract-level extension
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false

Topics

institutional-designdynamic-regulationhistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref

Provenance

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0022-oldest-0050-0002-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.

Verify

Canonical markdown sha256: 0a4f9606d63d10eeaeb4cd0a84367c08c99af4bec295a61899af031842b6a057
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-209.md | sha256sum