Qualification: Deliberation, Information Aggregation, and Collective Decision Making
Swank and Wrasai provide an independent economic-model qualification of Kaal's functional separation between deliberation and a binding final act. Their collective-decision procedure has three stages: agents acquire information about a project, communicate, and then vote. The model also shows that communication changes incentives to acquire information: when information is cheap, communication can reduce effort through free-riding; when information is expensive, communication can increase effort by making acquired information useful to another agent. This supports the narrower claim that deliberation develops information before a distinct final institutional decision, while showing that the informational benefit is incentive-sensitive rather than automatic. It does not support the broader assertion that adjudication is priced through stake, reputation, sanctions, or settlement, and it does not validate Kaal's agentic reputation substrate.
institutional-designconsensus-and-securityscholarly-growth-coveragescholarly-literaturedeliberationinformation-aggregationcollective-decision-makingvotingincentive-design