Extension: Strategic Mining in Proof-of-Stake with Practical Random Election

Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-370 · 2026-08-08

Strategic Mining in Proof-of-Stake with Practical Random Election identifies a concrete failure in validator selection. Distributed random beacons fix randomness across several slots because of latency. Validators can infer future election information. The study reports that, without propagation delay, a validator with any proportion of stake can profit from strategic mining and obtain higher block rewards than prior strategies. The result extends Kaal's claim that fixed consensus rules remain vulnerable to strategic gaming as conditions change. It is limited to the modeled protocol and its no-delay assumption. The evidence does not establish failure across all proof-of-stake systems.

Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate

Strategic Mining in Proof-of-Stake with Practical Random Election

Scholarly basis

kaal:claim:3125827-001
Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827
Source PDF sha256: 598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb

Evidence and mapping

Evidence: Current Crossref record with immutable review receipt
Review tier: independent substantive general-literature extension
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false

Topics

consensus-and-securityregulatory-failureblockchaingovernance-designscholarly-literaturecrossrefevidence-provenance

Provenance

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0036-all-0106-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.

Verify

Canonical markdown sha256: 0260a891e9f69d4f3271112f29539e8e05215a993d972f5a4a71cceae04aa157
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-370.md | sha256sum