kaal:claim:1558614-004

Beliefs about whether markets fail are causally consequential rather than merely academic: bankers who believe markets fail invest more cautiously, and regulators who believe markets fail regulate more aggressively.

Source quote, verbatim

Bankers who believe that markets fail may be more cautious when investing in markets, and regulators who believe that markets fail may be more aggressive when regulating markets.

From

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), I.B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Cite as

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

Holds when

holds across both national settings the authors compare

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedeconomicsrisk-and-incentives

Verify

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Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/40199bb7c2c9127e...json
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