kaal:claim:1558614-008

Because German banks absorbed both the 2008 credit crisis and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis while American banks faced only the first, German regulators and bankers are likely to impose stricter substantive risk management rules than countries that faced only one of those shocks.

German banks, like Ameri- can banks, have been exposed to the 2008 credit crisis, and unlike their American rivals, German banks also face a second threat in their exposure to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), I.B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• written before the sovereign debt crisis had fully played out
• assumes the two shocks compound rather than offset

predictivesupport: arguedsystemic-riskrisk-and-incentives

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