German corporate law's historical focus on conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders leaves it poorly equipped to address managerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.
Source quote, verbatim
Ar- guably, a legal system that focuses on the interaction of controlling and minority shareholders is not as well equipped to deal with mana- gerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.
From
Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), III. Cultural Components of Risk Taking and Controlling Risk, p. 22 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF
Cite as
Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
Holds when
systems where ownership is concentrated and the central conflict is shareholder against shareholder
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