kaal:claim:1558614-015

German corporate law's historical focus on conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders leaves it poorly equipped to address managerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.

Ar- guably, a legal system that focuses on the interaction of controlling and minority shareholders is not as well equipped to deal with mana- gerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), III. Cultural Components of Risk Taking and Controlling Risk, p. 22
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• systems where ownership is concentrated and the central conflict is shareholder against shareholder

failuresupport: arguedfailure: misaimed conflict focusfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismcorporate-governancerisk-and-incentives

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