kaal:claim:1558614-031

The United States compensates for its lenient corporate law treatment of risk taking under the business judgment rule with a comparatively strict disclosure regime and a robust securities class action litigation regime; substantive corporate law pushes the monitoring requirement toward leniency while securities enforcement pushes it back toward stringency.

In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the Unit- ed States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime and robust securities class action litigation regime.

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), IV.C. Securities Disclosure, p. 41
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

mechanismsupport: arguedsecurities-lawlaw-and-legal-systemsdisclosurecompliance

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