kaal:claim:1558614-032

In the United States the duty to disclose risk indirectly generates risk monitoring, because directors who know they are responsible for disclosing risk have reason to monitor it even though corporate law imposes no explicit duty to monitor.

Directors thus may monitor for risk because they know they are responsible for dis- closing it.

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), IV.C. Securities Disclosure, p. 41
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• risk must be of a kind that securities law requires to be disclosed

mechanismsupport: arguedcompliancedisclosurecorporate-governancelaw-and-legal-systemssecurities-law

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