kaal:claim:1908473-011

Existing proposals for implementing contingent capital do not explain how they would address the information asymmetries and principal and agent problems that may lie at the core of the credit crisis.

Although contingent capital has many beneficial attributes, existing proposals for implementing contingent capital are unclear as to how they will address information asymmetries and principal/agent problems.

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011), II.B. Limitations and Open Issues, p. 20
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

• Assumes information asymmetries and principal agent problems were central causes of the crisis

failuresupport: arguedfailure: unaddressed-agency-problemsfamily: governance-participation-collapsedisclosureai-and-agentscorporate-governancecontingent-capital

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• Extension: Accountability and Corporate Governance