kaal:claim:1908473-024

Departing from Coffee's design, super-voting rights should be allocated to contingent capital holders only if the first trigger failed to improve the institution's financial health; at the first trigger the new shareholder gets one vote per share.

Although we agree with the need for increased voting rights, the proposal in this Article would allocate super-voting rights to CCS holders only if the first trigger did not result in an improvement of the financial institution's financial health.

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011), IV.A. First Trigger: Debt-Equity Conversion, p. 34
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

• Voting rights escalate only on a continuing downward trend after the first conversion

designsupport: arguedgovernance-designcontingent-capital

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