kaal:claim:1908473-036

Contingent capital with increased voting rights delivers a more flexible and efficient outcome than Chapter 11, because it requires neither court involvement nor a threshold of creditor approval.

Source quote, verbatim

The proposal in this Article would, however, create a far more flexible and efficient solution than Chapter 11. Neither court involvement nor a threshold of creditor approval would be required.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011), VI.A. Debtor in Possession and Creditors' Committees, p. 51
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

Holds when

Contingent capital holders with increased voting rights hold powers comparable to a creditors' committee

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedeconomics

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