kaal:claim:1998455-011

Trigger designs can be ranked by the certainty they give market participants: institution specific triggers presumably grant the most certainty, while regulatory trigger designs provide lower levels of certainty.

Source quote, verbatim

While institution-specific triggers would presum- ably grant most certainty to market participants, regulatory trig- ger designs could provide lower levels of certainty.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), III.B. Unresolved Design Issues, p. 23
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

Holds when

comparing institution specific triggers against regulatory or systemic triggers

Classification

conditionsupport: arguedcontingent-capitaleconomics

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