kaal:claim:1998455-022

Absent cross holdings, the opposite conflict arises: institutions holding a competitor's converted contingent capital could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of that competitor.

Without CCS cross holdings, SIFIs could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of the competitor if a con- version to equity should have been triggered.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), IV.B. Conflicts of Interest, p. 35
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where a SIFI holds a competitor's CCS without a reciprocal position
• after a conversion to equity has been triggered

failuresupport: arguedfailure: adversarial-competitor-votingfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismgovernance-designcontingent-capitalcorporate-governance

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