kaal:claim:1998455-038

Rather than banning purchases by systemically important institutions of each other's contingent capital, which could be detrimental to market evolution, the design should require disclosure of the purchaser's identity and approval by the issuer.

Source quote, verbatim

An outright ban of SIFI CCS purchases, or at least purchases in other SIFI CCS issuances, could be detrimental for CCS mar- ket evolution. Perhaps a mechanism that requires disclosure of the identity of the purchaser for SIFIs and approval by the issuer could address these concerns.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), VII.D. Additional Considerations, p. 48
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

Holds when

where the concern is competitors acquiring voting rights as equity holders upon conversion

Classification

designsupport: argueddisclosureeconomicsinstitutional-design

Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/e65086a5a4b7c4b0...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-038.md | sha256sum