kaal:claim:2029983-016

Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.

Source quote, verbatim

Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012), II. Forum Competition After Morrison, p. 24
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

Holds when

European collective procedures that require plaintiffs to opt in

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: opt-in-class-size-ceilingfamily: enforcement-gapinstitutional-design

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