kaal:claim:2061166-005

Because most national crisis responses took the form of public bail-outs adopted without broad international consensus, they increased the threat of international regulatory arbitrage and damaged the global competitiveness of national financial markets.

Most national measures took the form of public bail-outs without broad international consensus,44 thereby increasing the threat of international regulatory arbitrage as well as negatively impacting the global competitiveness of national financial markets.

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012), II. INTERNATIONAL MITIGATION INITIATIVES, RESOLUTION TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 · source PDF

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

• crisis-era emergency measures adopted without international coordination

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: Uncoordinated bail-outs breed regulatory arbitragefamily: regulatory-arbitragesystemic-riskregulatory-failureinstitutional-design

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