kaal:claim:2061166-036

Using contingent capital as a preventative tool does not foreclose the statutory core power or the debt write-down tool within resolution; if early contractual write-down and conversion fail, authorities remain free to intervene and impose a haircut on shareholders, debt investors and other private parties.

Source quote, verbatim

Contingent capital as a preventative tool would not impede the statutory core power or debt write-down tool of bail-inables within resolution.

From

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012), VI. CONTINGENT CAPITAL AS A PREVENTATIVE TOOL IN EUROPEAN UNION BANK RESTRUCTURING, p. 71
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 · source PDF

Cite as

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

Holds when

contractual conversion at an early stage that does not achieve the desired result

Classification

designsupport: arguedcontingent-capitalsystemic-risk

Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/336bb0c1960cd69e...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-036.md | sha256sum