kaal:claim:2097160-003

Contingent convertible bonds placed in executive compensation serve a different purpose than those sold to investors: the point is not capital infusion during a crisis but governance-improving design that optimizes management incentives.

bonds issued to investors, the emphasis for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation is not on a capital infusion when the Systematically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) is in a crisis,13 but rather on governance-improving designs to help optimize management's incentives.14

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), I. Introduction, p. 6
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• contingent convertible bonds held by executives rather than outside investors

definitionalsupport: arguedcontingent-capitalcorporate-governancegovernance-designrisk-and-incentives

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