kaal:claim:2097160-011

A contingent capital award to executives without a conversion feature yields only limited governance improvement and only limited incentive to lower risk-taking; in its current form it operates as a mere compensation supplement.

Barclays's issuance of contingent convertible bonds without a conversion feature to its executives shows limited governance improvements. Without a conversion to equity, Barclays provides only limited incentives for its executives to lower risk-taking.

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), V.A Precedent Barclays, p. 33
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• contingent capital awards without conversion into equity

failuresupport: arguedfailure: CoCo pay as compensation supplement onlyfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismcontingent-capitalrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designcorporate-governance

• specializes kaal:claim:1998455-032 A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important instituti...

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