kaal:claim:2097160-022

Early triggers in executive compensation improve the signaling of default risk by producing the signal while default risk is present but still somewhat remote.

Source quote, verbatim

Early triggers for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages may increase and optimize the signaling of default risk at a time when the risk of default is present but still somewhat remote.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), V.B.2 The Benefits of Early Triggers, p. 44
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivescontingent-capitalsystemic-risk

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:2957645-021 Appropriate use of contingent capital triggers can further lower the default risk of the contingent capital se...

Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/23ab6c94514bbd0d...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-022.md | sha256sum