kaal:claim:2097160-038

Trigger designs that work well in institutions with the traditional mix of debt-holders and shareholders may be suboptimal once executives themselves hold contingent convertible bonds.

Trigger designs that may work well in financial institutions with the traditional mix of debt- holders and shareholders may be suboptimal if executives also hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible bonds.275

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), VI.C The Impact of Ownership Characteristics on Trigger Design, p. 68
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• executives hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible bonds

conditionsupport: arguedfailure: Ownership blind trigger designfamily: trigger-design-failurecontingent-capitalgovernance-designcorporate-governance

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