kaal:claim:2097160-040

An early trigger design for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation enables earlier signaling of default risk, increases incentives for creditors and shareholders to monitor, and increases executives' incentives to lower risk-taking.

Contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for executives to lower their risk-taking.282

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), VII. Conclusion, p. 69
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

designsupport: arguedcontingent-capitalrisk-and-incentivescompliancegovernance-designcorporate-governance

• extends kaal:claim:1998455-032 A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important instituti...

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