kaal:claim:2267560-003

Dynamic regulation as part of institutional design in the evolution of law has not been systematically analyzed, despite an existing economics literature applying dynamic regulation to telecommunications, learning by doing, and principal-agent problems.

Source quote, verbatim

Dynamic regulation as part of institutional design in the evolution of law has not been systematically analyzed.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), I. Introduction, p. 3
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

Classification

empiricalsupport: evidenceddynamic-regulationinstitutional-design

Related claims

restated_by kaal:claim:2273857-045 Although some regulators use the term dynamic regulation in the context of SEC exemptive powers, the literatur...

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