kaal:claim:2267560-005

Rulemaking conducted under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality produces suboptimal outcomes that require costly rule revisions, retractions, and additional rulemaking.

Rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality can lead to suboptimal outcomes that may require rule revision and/or additional rulemaking.

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), II.1 Dynamic Regulation in the NIE Framework, p. 4
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

• information is systematically incomplete
• actors are boundedly rational

failuresupport: arguedfailure: suboptimal rulemaking under incomplete informationfamily: regulatory-lagrisk-and-incentives

• restated_by kaal:claim:2273857-026 The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and pr...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2273857-019 The bounded rationality of public rulemakers aggravates shock conditions during rulemaking, because rulemakers...
• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-005 Because transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality shape the rulemaking process, even s...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/8422c42b2b3f065c...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-005.md | sha256sum