kaal:claim:2273857-026

The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes with long-term implications for financial markets and the economy.

Source quote, verbatim
The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and can produce suboptimal regulatory outcomes, often with long-term implications for financial markets and the economy.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), II.2 Regulatory Sine Curve, p. 15
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: cyclical rulemaking costfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationrisk-and-incentivesregulatory-failure

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