kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-003

Rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones the enactment of rules until rulemakers hold sufficient relevant and institution specific information, instead of proceeding by trial and error under incomplete information and bounded rationality.

Rather than engaging in suboptimal trial-and-error rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality, rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones enacting rules until rulemakers have sufficient relevant and institution-specific information for rulemaking

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014), II. Dynamic Regulation, p. 8
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Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

• rulemakers are able to defer action
• information can in fact be accumulated ex ante

designsupport: argueddynamic-regulationrisk-and-incentives

• extends kaal:claim:2273857-026 The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and pr...

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