kaal:claim:2267560-029

Competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, but it nevertheless provides incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory solutions from other jurisdictions.

the competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, (Kirchner, Painter and Kaal 2005; Carbonara and Parisi 2008; Kerber 2000; Heine and Kerber 2002), it can nevertheless provide incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), III.2 Private vs. Public Rulemaking, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

mechanismsupport: arguedeconomicslaw-and-legal-systemsinstitutional-design

• extended_by kaal:claim:5886442-030 Dynamic regulation is defined as an optimization process for the learning experience in the New Institutional ...

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